893.04 Annotation
A tort claim accrues when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. This "discovery rule" applies to all tort actions other than those governed by a statutory discovery rule. Hansen v. A. H. Robins, Inc.
113 Wis. 2d 550,
335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
893.04 Annotation
When the plaintiff's early subjective lay person's belief that a furnace caused the injury was contradicted by examining physicians, the cause of action against the furnace company did not accrue until the plaintiff's suspicion was confirmed by later medical diagnosis. Borello v. U.S. Oil Co.
130 Wis. 2d 397,
388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
893.04 Annotation
Claimed ignorance of, and a blatant failure to follow, applicable regulations cannot be construed as reasonable diligence in discovering an injury when following the rules would have resulted in earlier discovery. Stroh Die Casting v. Monsanto Co.
177 Wis. 2d 91,
502 N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1993).
893.04 Annotation
The day upon which a cause of action accrues is not included in computing the period of limitation. Pufahl v. Williams,
179 Wis. 2d 104,
506 N.W.2d 747 (1993).
893.04 Annotation
A plaintiff can rely on the discovery rule only if he or she has exercised reasonable diligence. Jacobs v. Nor-Lake,
217 Wis. 2d 625,
579 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1998),
97-1740.
893.04 Annotation
The discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations that limit the time to sue from the time when the action "accrues," being the time of discovery. The discovery rule does not apply to a statute of repose, a statute that specifies the time of accrual and limits the time suit can be brought from that specified date. Tomczak v. Bailey,
218 Wis. 2d 245,
578 N.W.2d 166 (1998),
95-2733.
893.04 Annotation
Knowing that a particular product caused an injury, an injured party cannot extend the accrual date for a cause of action against the product's manufacturer due to the subsequent discovery of possible connections between that product and another manufacturer's product in causing the injury. Baldwin v. Badger Mining Corporation & Mine Safety Appliances Co. 2003 WI App 95,
264 Wis. 2d 301,
663 N.W.2d 382,
02-1197.
893.04 Annotation
Computing time in tort statutes of limitation. Ghiardi, 64 MLR 575 (1981).
893.04 Annotation
Computing Time. Ghiardi. Wis. Law. March 1993.
893.05
893.05
Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy. When the period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy.
893.05 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.05 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case law. See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390,
14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated at page 393: "In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which enjoys constitutional protection". [Bill 326-A]
893.07
893.07
Application of foreign statutes of limitation. 893.07(1)(1) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which applies has expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
893.07(2)
(2) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which applies to that action has not expired, but the applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
893.07 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.07 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Sub. (1) applies the provision of s. 893.05 that the running of a statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the remedy to a foreign cause of action on which an action is attempted to be brought in Wisconsin in a situation where the foreign period has expired. Sub. (1) changes the law of prior s. 893.205 (1), which provided that a resident of Wisconsin could sue in this state on a foreign cause of action to recover damages for injury to the person even if the foreign period of limitation had expired.
893.07 Annotation
Sub. (2) applies the Wisconsin statute of limitations to a foreign cause of action if the Wisconsin period is shorter than the foreign period and the Wisconsin period has run. [Bill 326-A]
893.07 Annotation
The borrowing statute was properly applied to an injury received outside of this state. A conflict of laws analysis was not appropriate. Guertin v. Harbour Assurance Co.
141 Wis. 2d 622,
415 N.W.2d 831 (1987).
893.07 Annotation
Section 893.16 (1) is effective to toll the running of the statute of limitations, even when under s. 893.07 the plaintiff would be barred from bringing suit under applicable foreign law. Scott v. First State Insurance Co.
155 Wis. 2d 608,
456 N.W.2d 312 (1990).
893.07 Annotation
This section is applicable to actions on contracts. A claim is foreign when the final significant event giving rise to a suable event, the alleged breach, occurs outside the state. Abraham v. General Casualty Co.
217 Wis. 2d 294,
576 N.W.2d 46 (1998),
95-2918.
893.07 Annotation
Sub. (1) refers to "the period of limitation," as defined by the foreign jurisdiction, that governs the case in the foreign state. Application of this rule includes a limitation period that operates as a statute of repose. Wenke v. Gehl Company, 2004 WI 103,
274 Wis. 2d 220,
682 N.W.2d 405,
01-2649.
893.07 Annotation
A tort action based on an injury received outside of this state was "foreign." Johnson v. Deltadynamics, Inc.
813 F.2d 944 (1987).
893.07 Annotation
Under this section, a foreign jurisdiction's period of limitations is borrowed, but not its period of repose. Beard v. J. I. Case Co.
823 F.2d 1095 (1987).
893.07 Annotation
This section directs courts to apply the shortest limitation period possible to foreign causes of action, whether the applicable statue is a statue of limitations or a statute of repose. Merner v. Deere & Co.
176 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2001).
893.07 Annotation
Wisconsin's borrowing statute: Did we shortchange ourselves? 70 MLR 120 (1986).
893.07 Annotation
Interpreting Wisconsin's Borrowing Statute. Wiegand. Wis. Law. May 2001.
LIMITATIONS TOLLED OR EXTENDED
893.10
893.10
Actions, time for commencing. The period within which an action may be commenced shall not be considered to have expired when the court before which the action is pending is satisfied that the person originally served knowingly gave false information to the officer with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty in the service of any summons or civil process. If the court so finds, the period of limitation is extended for one year.
893.10 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.10 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.14 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.11
893.11
Extension of time if no person to sue. The fact that there is no person in existence who is authorized to bring an action on a cause of action at the time it accrues shall not extend the time within which, according to this chapter, an action may be commenced upon the cause of action to more than double the period otherwise prescribed by law.
893.11 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.11 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.50 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893 and revised for the purpose of textual clarity only. [Bill 326-A]
893.12
893.12
Advance payment of damages; limitation extended. The period fixed for the limitation for the commencement of actions, if a payment is made as described in
s. 885.285 (1), shall be either the period of time remaining under the original statute of limitations or 3 years from the date of the last payment made under
s. 885.285 (1), whichever is greater.
893.12 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.12 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is created to place the statute extending statute of limitations when there has been a settlement and advance payment of claim for damages into the subchapter of chapter 893 on extension of statute of limitations. The provisions of prior s. 885.285 (4) are contained without change in newly created s. 893.12. [Bill 326-A]
893.12 Annotation
Any payment made in advance or settlement of either personal injury or property damage claims, when the plaintiff has both, extends the limitation for a personal injury claim, if it is made within the 3-year limit period of s. 893.54 (1). Abraham v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.
115 Wis. 2d 678,
341 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1983).
893.12 Annotation
This section does not apply to foreign causes of action. Section 893.07 (1) prevents s. 893.12 from extending foreign statutes of limitation. Thimm v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp.
148 Wis. 2d 332,
434 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1988).
893.12 Annotation
The tolling provision applies only to the party that received a settlement or advance payment under s. 885.285. It does not apply to a stranger to the settlement. Riley v. Doe,
152 Wis. 2d 766,
449 N.W.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1989).
893.12 Annotation
For a period of limitations to be extended under this section as the result of a "payment" by check, the check must be accepted and negotiated. Parr v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Const. Trades,
177 Wis. 2d 140,
501 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1993).
893.12 Annotation
To be a payment under s. 885.285 that will toll or extend the statute of limitations, a payment must be related to fault or liability. Gurney v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co.
188 Wis. 2d 68,
523 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1994).
893.12 Annotation
The waiver by the defendant medical provider in a medical malpractice action of the copayment portion of the amount due for the plaintiff's medical treatment did not constitute a payment under s. 885.285 or 893.12. Young v. Aurora Medical Center, 2004 WI App 71,
272 Wis. 2d 300,
679 N.W.2d 549,
03-0224.
893.13
893.13
Tolling of statutes of limitation. 893.13(1)
(1) In this section and
ss. 893.14 and
893.15 "final disposition" means the end of the period in which an appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment of the trial court, the end of the period within which an order for rehearing can be made in the highest appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or the final order or judgment of the court to which remand from an appellate court is made, whichever is latest.
893.13(2)
(2) A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the commencement of the action to enforce the cause of action to which the period of limitation applies. The law limiting the time for commencement of the action is tolled for the period from the commencement of the action until the final disposition of the action.
893.13(3)
(3) If a period of limitation is tolled under
sub. (2) by the commencement of an action and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
893.13 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.13 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Section 893.35 is repealed and this section created to clarify the ending of the tolled period of a statute of limitations in the various situations which can arise when an appeal is taken.
893.13 Annotation
Sub. (3) would apply when, for example, an action was commenced when the period of limitation has only 5 days left to run. The running of the period of limitation is tolled for the period from commencement of the action until the day of its final disposition, such as dismissal of the action based on the pleadings. A 30-day period is then provided (rather than the 5 days left on the original period of limitation) in order to provide a reasonable time for a party to consider whether to recommence the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.13 Annotation
This section does not toll the statute to allow an independent claim by an insurer. It simply insures that the joinder of constituent parts of a cause of action during the pendency of the action is not frustrated by the application of the appropriate statute of limitations. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Owens,
191 Wis. 2d 745,
530 N.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1995).
893.13 Annotation
The filing of an action, subsequently voluntarily dismissed, tolls the statute of limitations under sub. (2) for the period specified in sub. (1) for cases in which no appeal is taken. Johnson v. County of Crawford,
195 Wis. 2d 374,
536 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1995),
95-0144.
893.13 Annotation
A suit filed prior to the expiration of the 120-day period for a denial of claim under s. 893.80 is not truly commenced and does not toll the statute of limitations when filed. Colby v. Columbia County,
202 Wis. 2d 342,
550 N.W.2d 124 (1996),
93-3348.
893.135
893.135
Tolling of statute of limitations for marital property agreements. Any statute of limitations applicable to an action to enforce a marital property agreement under
ch. 766 is tolled as provided under
s. 766.58 (13).
893.135 History
History: 1985 a. 37;
1987 a. 393.
893.137
893.137
Tolling of statute of limitations for certain time-share actions. Any statute of limitations affecting the right of an association organized under
s. 707.30 (2) or a time-share owner, as defined in
s. 707.02 (31), against a developer, as defined in
s. 707.02 (11), is tolled as provided in
s. 707.34 (1) (bm).
893.137 History
History: 1987 a. 399.
893.14
893.14
Limitation on use of a right of action as a defense or counterclaim. Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, the period within which a cause of action may be used as a defense or counterclaim is computed from the time of the accrual of the cause of action until the time that the plaintiff commences the action in which the defense or counterclaim is made. A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the assertion of the defense or the commencement of the counterclaim until final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. If a period of limitation is tolled under this section and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
893.14 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.14 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is based upon previous ss. 893.48 and 893.49. The section provides, however, that a statute of limitations is tolled only from the assertion of the defense or counterclaim until the final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. Under previous s. 893.49 a statute of limitations was tolled from the commencement of the action in which the defense or counterclaim was asserted until the termination of the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.15
893.15
Effect of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum on a Wisconsin cause of action. 893.15(1)
(1) In this section "a non-Wisconsin forum" means all courts, state and federal, in states other than this state and federal courts in this state.
893.15(2)
(2) In a non-Wisconsin forum, the time of commencement or final disposition of an action is determined by the local law of the forum.
893.15(3)
(3) A Wisconsin law limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin cause of action is tolled from the period of commencement of the action in a non-Wisconsin forum until the time of its final disposition in that forum.
893.15(4)
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to an action commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action in a non-Wisconsin forum after the time when the action is barred by a law of the forum limiting the time for commencement of an action.
893.15(5)
(5) If an action is commenced in a non-Wisconsin forum on a Wisconsin cause of action after the time when the Wisconsin period of limitation has expired but before the foreign period of limitation has expired, the action in the non-Wisconsin forum has no effect on the Wisconsin period of limitation.
893.15 History
History: 1979 c. 323.
893.15 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Sub. (1) defines the term "a non-Wisconsin forum". "State" is defined in s. 990.01 (40) to include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and territories of the United States.
893.15 Annotation
Sub. (2) determines the commencement and termination of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum by the law of that forum. "Local law" is referred to so that the non-Wisconsin court determining the commencement of an action in, for example, Illinois will use Illinois law, not including any other law which an Illinois court might use under a choice of law theory.
893.15 Annotation
Sub. (3) applies the tolling effect of Wisconsin statutes to actions on Wisconsin causes of action brought in federal courts in Wisconsin and to all other courts, state and federal, in the United States.
893.15 Annotation
Sub. (4) prevents the commencement of an action in a forum whose statute of limitations has run from extending the Wisconsin tolling period.
893.15 Annotation
Sub. (5) prevents the maintenance of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum from extending a Wisconsin statute of limitations. [Bill 326-A]
893.15 Annotation
A voluntarily dismissed federal action does not toll the Wisconsin statute of limitations. A voluntarily dismissed federal action is a nullity, having no effect on a statute of limitations. Culbert v. Ciresi, 2003 WI App 158,
266 Wis. 2d 189,
667 N.W.2d 825,
02-3320.
893.16
893.16
Person under disability. 893.16(1)
(1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues, either under the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers; or mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, except that where the disability is due to mental illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years.
893.16(2)
(2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of limitation otherwise prescribed.
893.16(3)
(3) A disability does not exist, for the purposes of this section, unless it existed when the cause of action accrues.
893.16(4)
(4) When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the time the cause of action accrues, the 2-year period specified in
sub. (1) does not begin until they all are removed.
893.16(5)
(5) This section applies only to statutes in this chapter limiting the time for commencement of an action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim except it does not apply to:
893.16(5)(a)
(a) Actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for escape;
893.16(5)(c)
(c) A cause of action which accrues prior to July 1, 1980.
893.16 History
History: 1979 c. 323;
1997 a. 133.
893.16 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is based on present ss. 893.135, 893.33, 893.37 and 893.38. Previous ss. 893.135 and 893.33 stated that the time of disability is not counted as the running of a statute of limitation and further stated that an action could be brought within a specified time after the disability ceased. This is inherently inconsistent and is replaced in s. 893.16 by the simple provision that the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases. Changes from previous s. 893.135 are:
893.16 Annotation
(a) The period within which to sue after the period of disability ends is reduced from 5 years to 2 years.
893.16 Annotation
(b) The maximum extension time available to those under disability of insanity or imprisonment is limited to 5 years. This means that such individuals must sue within 5 years after the basic applicable statute of limitations would have run against one not under disability, or within 2 years after the disability ends, whichever period is shorter.
